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Dynasty trusts: another view
by Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus 
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Member of the Iowa Bar, 515-
294-6354, harl@iastate.edu
An article published in a recent issue of an agricultural publication about “dynasty trusts” merits a response. While such 
trusts may offer some attractive short-term fea-
tures, the probable long-term consequences are so-
bering. Indeed, from both a policy perspective and 
from the standpoint of the best long-term interests 
of generations to come, it has been the conclusion 
of this author that setting up such a trust would 
likely produce enormously disadvantageous results 
if widely used. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive 
of a plan that would be more disadvantageous to 
future generations.
Here are the arguments supporting that conclusion.
The rule against perpetuities
The concept of “dynasty trusts” that can last for-
ever is dependent upon repeal of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities which has been a part of the common 
law heritage for more than three centuries. The 
Rule, as it is commonly known, had its origins in 
the Duke of Norfolk’s case in the late 17th Cen-
tury. The case involved disagreements among the 
heirs of the Duke of Norfolk over the propriety 
of leaving property in successive life estates. The 
court believed that it was wrong to tie up property 
beyond the lives of persons living at the time the 
property was conveyed, although the exact period 
for which such transfers should be permitted was 
not determined until roughly 150 years later.
As followed at common law (and the statutory ver-
sions that followed the common law) in the United 
States, the Rule established a limit on holding 
property in trust or otherwise precluding property 
from vesting, measured by a class of lives in being 
plus 21 years. That usually has permitted the life 
of a trust to last for 100 years, but usually not more 
than about 120 years. About half of the states ad-
opted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetu-
ities (USRAP) under which an interest in property 
was valid if it would necessarily vest or fail within 
lives in being plus 21 years (basically the common 
law rule) or the property actually vested within 90 
years of creation.
However, commencing about 30 years ago, a trend 
developed of repealing the Rule and about half the 
states have done so.
Number of beneficiaries
The problems associated with so-called “dynasty” 
trusts are principally long-term in nature and 
involve significant policy issues. First, the trusts 
are irrevocable – they generally cannot be revoked 
or amended. Most think in terms of a couple of 
generations. But let’s fast forward to the year 2511, 
500 years from now. These trusts are set up to last 
forever. Not just 500 years or 1,000 years but for-
ever. What started out in 2011 as a couple with two 
children would, with normal fertility levels, have 
increased to 3.4 million beneficiaries in 500 years. 
After only 150 years, the trust would be expected 
to have around 2500 beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries would by then be likely to view 
their interest in the trust much as the way the 
Social Security Trust Fund is viewed today – very 
distant and with virtually no influence over the 
trust or its investments. It would fundamentally 
alter the way individuals and family view property 
– as some distant and largely unresponsive fund. 
Getting agreement to amend the trust would be 
almost impossible.
Beneficiaries still farming?
Although certainly not limited to owning farmland, 
for those owning farmland the view of many who 
have set up such trusts is that successors within the 
family will continue to farm the land (or at least 
to own the land as landlords). Is that a realistic 
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assumption? We don’t know what technology lies 
ahead but just in the past 80 years the number of 
farmers has dwindled sharply. It seems a safe bet 
that the future will see more of the same. There is 
no assurance in 500 years that any of the succes-
sors within the family would have the remotest 
interest in farming.
Would the land in question even be used for farm-
ing in 500 years? Or would it be covered over with 
concrete and blacktop as a city? Or a huge regional 
airport? Would the family successors who might 
be interested in farming be working in the shadow 
of a skyscraper?
Past generations have been able to assess their 
interests and abilities and strike out in areas 
hardly dreamed of by their parents, taking their 
share of the family wealth with them and under 
their control.
What about access to assets?
Just ponder for a moment what the chances of 
acquiring land (or other assets) today would be if 
the wealthy in 1011 had frozen all of the land in 
trust? It has been an article of faith in this coun-
try that if one works hard, saves their money, 
some day they can acquire property. That would 
be substantially curbed if dynasty trusts were to 
become widespread.
Who would be in control of the land?
Most dynasty trusts are set up with a bank or 
trust company as trustee. That might involve trust 
administration in places like Cedar Rapids or 
Peoria or even Indianapolis. But the way banking 
is changing and consolidating, the trust might end 
up being administered in Beijing or Singapore or 
some other distant place.
It would place enormous economic power in the 
hands of the corporate trustees with little account-
ability. There is no secret why banks and trust 
companies have been the big advocates for dynasty 
trusts. That whistling sound overhead is money and 
other assets on the way to South Dakota, Alaska and 
the other states that have repealed the Rule. More-
over, the fees charged are largely unregulated.
Reduced economic growth
It is well known that corporate trustees tend to 
be cautious and conservative, not wanting to be 
surcharged for mistakes in judgment in handling 
a trust. With the trust assets largely shielded from 
market forces, widespread ownership of assets in 
such trusts would almost certainly reduce the rate 
of economic growth in the country. It is an article 
of economic faith that economic growth is maxi-
mized if resources are fully subject to the forces 
and pressures of the market and are routed to 
where the economic return is the greatest.
The administration’s position
The current Administration (principally originat-
ing in the Department of the Treasury) in February 
2011 published the “green book” which outlined 
a proposal to limit the duration of perpetual or 
“dynastic” trusts to a maximum of 90 years at 
which time the exemption of generation skipping 
would expire. Technically, the generation skipping 
tax exclusion allocated to the trust would terminate 
on the 90th anniversary of the creation of the trust. 
That seems to be sufficiently long to accommodate 
the usual objectives of trustors other than to create 
a perpetual trust.
The key question
Do we want to place our economic system in 
jeopardy with such a short-sighted move as to see 
a substantial share of the country’s wealth tied 
up in trust forever? Individuals emigrating to this 
country a century or two ago did so in large mea-
sure because of the promise of economic opportu-
nity. The risks to our system of property rights and 
access to assets is too precious to sacrifice at the 
altar of rescuing banks and trust companies from 
the competition emanating from the 20 or so states 
that have been foolish enough to repeal the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. That rule was formulated in 
the 17th Century to prevent land from being tied 
up forever. 
. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimina-
tion in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, gender, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, 
sexual orientation, and marital or family status. (Not all prohibited 
bases apply to all programs.) Many materials can be made avail-
able in alternative formats for ADA clients. To file a complaint of 
discrimination, write USDA, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, 
Permission to copy
Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension materials 
contained in this publication via copy machine or other 
copy technology, so long as the source (Ag Decision 
Maker Iowa State University Extension ) is clearly 
identifiable and the appropriate author is properly 
credited.
Whitten Building, 14th and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, 
DC 20250-9410 or call 202-720-5964. 
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of May 8 
and August 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture. Cathann A. Kress, director, Cooperative Extension Service, 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa. 
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Internet Updates
The following information files and tools have been added or updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm. 
Trend-Adjusted Actual Production History (APH) -- A1-56 (3 pages)
Historic Farmland Value Survey Data (Iowa State University) -- C2-70 (Decision Tool)
Current Profitability
The following tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/outlook.html. 
Corn Profitability -- A1-85 
Soybean Profitability -- A1-86
Season Average Price Calculator -- A2-15
Ethanol Profitability -- D1-10
Biodiesel Profitability -- D1-15
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Returns for Farrow-to-Finish -- B1-30
Returns for Weaned Pigs -- B1-33
Returns for Steer Calves -- B1-35
Returns for Yearling Steers -- B1-35
As legal philosophers have opined, “Let’s not let 
the dead hand of the past control the present.” The 
author of that quote, Professor Lewis Simes, an 
esteemed legal philosopher, stated, in articulat-
ing two reasons for limits on how long property 
should be able to be tied up in trust (or otherwise), 
“First, the Rule Against Perpetuities strikes a fair 
balance between the desires of members of the 
present generation, and similar desires of succeed-
ing generations, to do what they wish with the 
property which they enjoy. . . In a sense, this is a 
policy of alienability, but it is not alienability for 
productivity. It is alienability to enable people to 
do what they please at death with the property they 
enjoy during life. . . . But, in my opinion, a sec-
ond and even more important reason for the [Rule 
Against Perpetuities] is this. It is socially desirable 
that the wealth of the world be controlled by living 
members and not by the dead.”
*Reprinted with permission from the December 16, 2011 
issue of Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law Press Publi-
cations, Kelso, Washington. Footnotes not included.
